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Teacher Satisfaction and Turnover in Charter
Schools: Examining the Variations and
Possibilities for Collective Bargaining
in State Laws
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and JOSEPH OLUWOLE

Department of Counseling and Educational Leadership,
Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey, USA

Charter schools see as many as one in four teachers leave annually,
and recent evidence attributes much of this turnover to provisions
affected by collective bargaining processes and state laws such as
salary, benefits, job security, and working hours. There have been
many recent efforts to improve teacher voice in charter schools
(Kahlenberg & Potter, 2014), including engaging in some form of
collective bargaining, but we know little about the possibilities dictated by state laws. Therefore, this article describes the possibilities
and variations for collective bargaining by state and for different
charter types (e.g., conversion vs. newly created charters), as well
as laws that have the potential to improve teacher satisfaction in
charter schools. Ideally, state laws and the collective bargaining
process should provide the appropriate balance between flexibility for charter school leaders, teacher voice, and protections for
teachers.
KEYWORDS collective bargaining, teacher turnover, charter
schools, teacher satisfaction, teacher voice

INTRODUCTION
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have charter school laws.
According to the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS), 23 of
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these states are completely exempt from collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs), and only Iowa’s law requires charter schools to be part of their district’s collective bargaining agreements (NAPCS, 2014), though our analysis
shows the laws are in fact much more nuanced. The most recent estimates suggest that roughly 12% of charter schools have collective bargaining
agreements (Vevea, 2011). CBAs formally define what teachers will be paid
as well as benefits, staffing assignments, the length of the work day and
year, professional development time, hiring, dismissal, teacher evaluation,
class size, and how to allocate other various resources in schools (Paige,
2013; Podgursky, 2010; Strunk, 2014). Teachers have successfully negotiated for schools to adopt more stringent academic standards, mentoring
programs and peer review procedures through collective bargaining (Lindy,
2011; Paige, 2013). The presence of a collective bargaining agreement generally also affords teachers access to statutory arbitration procedures which
typically require arbitrators to review comparable salaries (Nixon, 2013).
According to Nixon (2013), “low paid employees could invoke or threaten
arbitration in order to achieve more equal pay” (p. 347).
Critics of collective bargaining argue that these agreements are overly
rigid, that they reduce collaboration and productivity, make it very difficult to fire incompetent teachers, and favor adult interests to the detriment
of students (Hess & Loup, 2008; Vevea, 2011). Proponents, such as union
representatives, see them as necessary to improving working conditions, conditions for learning, pay, and respect for teachers while helping to balance
power between labor and management, which can be particularly important
when leaders create policies and working conditions that are perceived as
unfair or inequitable (Hill, Rainey, & Rotherham, 2006).
Reflecting the larger national debate on collective bargaining and unionization in charter schools, union leaders in Chicago argued that charters
help spread disdain for unions and leave teachers without a voice on issues
like working conditions, teacher evaluations, and curriculum (Vevea, 2011).
By contrast, some Chicago charter school teachers worried about being
restricted by “red tape,” and charter advocates argued that unionization
undermines the premise that charter schools are more effective because they
have autonomy from the regulations and bureaucracies that govern traditional schools (Vevea, 2011). Although prominent charter supporters like
the NAPCS (2014) claim that exemption from collective bargaining is ideal,
views of bargaining and the process of unionization can vary within the
sector. For example, some believe CBAs could help reduce teacher burnout
and high turnover (Price, 2011) that afflicts many charter organizations (see
Torres, 2014a for a discussion of turnover in charter schools). In New York
City, teachers at one Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) school famously
attempted to unionize and accused the KIPP network of intimidating teachers who wanted to organize (Green, 2009), and the United Federation of
Teachers (UFT) created its own charter schools to foster teacher autonomy
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and empowerment (UFT, 2015). Others, like the nonprofit charter management organization (CMO) Green Dot, utilized a more flexible approach to
collective bargaining and unionization whereby teachers and administrators
negotiated salary, health care, class size, and working days and agreed on
these terms outside of the district’s CBA (Stulberg, 2010; Exstrom, 2012).
While perspectives and practices vary, they are seldom informed by
empirical research. Proposed changes to laws affecting teachers and collective bargaining in charter schools should account for current evidence related
to the growth and organizational health of charter schools.
Therefore, we examine a growing body of evidence that teacher satisfaction and turnover in charter schools is strongly associated with conditions
negotiated by the collective bargaining process such as salary, benefits, working hours, and job security. Given these strong empirical ties, we argue that
many charter schools would benefit from some form of collective bargaining
because it could alleviate teachers’ concerns and reduce widespread patterns of dissatisfaction and turnover in charter schools, which see as many
as one in four teachers leave on average annually (Stuit & Smith, 2012). There
have been many recent efforts to improve teacher voice in charter schools
(Kahlenberg & Potter, 2014), including engaging in some form of collective
bargaining, but we know little about the possibilities dictated by state laws.
Therefore, we focus on describing the possibilities and variations for collective bargaining by state and for different charter types (e.g., conversion vs.
newly created charters), as well as example laws that have the potential to
improve teacher satisfaction in charter schools.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Malloy and Wohlstetter (2003) reviewed research on working conditions in
charter schools that portrayed charter school teachers as generally enjoying
working with like-minded colleagues and having autonomy to make decisions over matters such as personnel, budget, and curriculum. Their review
highlighted other important patterns that, as we demonstrate in this review,
have remained remarkably consistent over time. For instance, they argued
that charter teachers “work longer hours . . . earn significantly less [pay]
than other public school colleagues, and receive less job security” (Malloy
& Wohlstetter, 2003, p. 219). They recommended improving these working conditions to increase the chances of attracting and retaining teachers.
Since that review, newer evidence shows a convincing and consistent connection between charter teachers’ perceptions of working conditions and
their decisions to leave, which is problematic given the higher than average
teacher turnover rates that characterize the sector. Nationally representative
data show that turnover is about 1.5 to 2.5 times greater in charter schools
compared to traditional public schools (TPSs) (Keigher, 2010; Stuit & Smith,
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2012). For instance, average teacher turnover was about 15% in TPSs compared to 24% in charter schools nationwide in 2008–2009 (Keigher, 2010),
with similarly high rates in CMOs that operate networks of charter schools
and now run nearly a third of the nation’s charter schools (Furgeson et al.,
2011; KIPP Foundation, 2013).
While there is a common view that turnover can be functional if the least
effective teachers leave (Whitmire, 2014), recent evidence suggests that it can
have an adverse effect on student achievement regardless of the quality of
teachers who leave or teachers who stay (Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013).
Turnover is especially concerning because of the substantial resources that
can go into recruiting and developing teachers in CMOs (Wilson, 2009) and
the limited supply of teachers that are willing and able to teach in popular
charter organizations such as the KIPP (Tuttle et al., 2013). Finally, organizations lose the benefit of expected increases in teacher effectiveness over
time (Harris & Sass, 2011; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005), a particularly
important consideration because an estimated third of charter school teachers have less than 3 years of teaching experience and are under the age of
30 (Stuit & Smith, 2012). Understanding and improving teachers’ perceptions
of working conditions in charters is crucial to their functional growth given
the substantial costs of turnover.

The Role of Salary, Job Security, Unionization and Teacher Burnout
Studies over the last two decades suggest that dissatisfaction with salary, benefits, job security, and teacher burnout associated with long working hours1
are among the most significant reasons teachers leave charters (Gross &
DeArmond, 2010; Koppich, Holmes, & Plecki, 1998; Lake, Dusseault, Bowen,
Demeritt, & Hill, 2010; Malloy & Wohlstetter, 2003; Miron & Applegate, 2007;
Stuit & Smith, 2012).
Evidence from the 1990s and early 2000s is mixed regarding whether,
on average, charter teachers earned a similar or smaller salary than their
TPS counterparts (see Malloy & Wohlstetter, 2003 for a discussion), but
regardless, recent studies demonstrate that charter teachers’ dissatisfaction
with salary is significantly related to their decisions to leave. Surveying over
6,000 charter school teachers across six states, Miron & Applegate (2007)
found that, compared to teachers who continued working at their schools,
leavers were significantly less satisfied with salary and benefits. Data from the
2000–2001 nationally representative Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) show
that, among teachers who decide to move schools, nearly double the percentage (40%) of charter school teachers cite salary and benefits as one
of their top five reasons for leaving compared to TPS teachers (Gross &
DeArmond, 2010). Moreover, nearly half of charter school teachers who
changed schools (46%) cited better job security as one of their top five
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reasons for switching, whereas it was not even considered to be one of the
top five reasons for TPS movers.
In the most comprehensive and rigorous study to date on charter school
turnover, Stuit and Smith (2012) found that, nationally, higher proportions of
uncertified and inexperienced teachers along with lower rates of union membership in charter schools were the strongest contributors to the turnover
gap between traditional public (12% turnover) and charter schools (24%
turnover), and perceived job security explained a small but significant portion of the turnover gap. Compensation was “significantly more important
to charter school teachers’ decisions to leave the profession voluntarily and
move schools than it was to TPS teachers” and “they were more than twice as
likely as TPS teachers to report that salaries and benefits were the single most
important reason for their departure” (Stuit & Smith, 2012, p. 276). While
some suggest that the main reason charter schools have higher turnover than
comparable traditional schools is because young, uncertified teachers represent larger proportions of charter teachers and are generally more likely to
leave teaching (Gross & DeArmond, 2010), job security, compensation, and
union membership remained important and significant reasons even after
controlling for these characteristics.
Finally, evidence also suggests that many charter schools require longer
working hours for teachers compared to TPSs that are bound by union
rules (Lake et al., 2010; Ni, 2012), particularly in high-performing CMOs. For
example, empirical studies attribute a longer school day and school year as
significantly related to CMO success (Fryer, 2014; Lake et al., 2012), and case
studies of CMO schools show that teachers work 60–80 hour weeks in some
organizations (Lake et al., 2010). Indeed, flexibility in hiring and firing as well
as the ability to offer a longer school day and school year are considered crucial for charter school success, and this explains some of the resistance to
unionization in charter schools (e.g., see Hess & Loup, 2008). The problem
is that long working hours and an overwhelming workload can also contribute to high teacher turnover in CMOs (Lake et al., 2010). CMO teachers
who feel their workload is unmanageable are significantly more likely to
leave their schools than those who do not: Using data from one large CMO,
one study found that nearly one in three teachers who considered their
workload unmanageable left compared to just one in 10 teachers who did
not consider their workload unmanageable (Torres, 2014a). Concerns over
teacher workload have caused many within and outside of the charter school
sector to wonder if the hours and intensity of the job are sustainable, and to
express doubts regarding the ability of high performing charter organizations
to functionally expand (Brill, 2011; Yeh, 2013).
On the whole, high rates of teacher turnover are related to conditions
affected by the collective bargaining process, suggesting a broader need
for teachers in some charters to collaborate with administration to define
appropriate boundaries.
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Efforts to Improve Working Conditions in Charter Schools
Despite no formal affiliation with the union, some charter networks like KIPP
are experimenting with policies like providing on-site childcare to improve
working conditions (Kahlenberg & Potter, 2015). Other charter schools such
as Green Dot Public Schools in Los Angeles have unionized but bargained
separately from schools within the district, allowing them to balance administrative flexibility with teacher voice and protections for teachers (Price,
2011). For example, Green Dot teachers are given explicit decision-making
authority in setting school policies such as the school budget, calendar,
and curriculum, work under the protection of “just cause discipline and
dismissal,” and agree to work a “professional work day” rather than have
defined minutes (Exstrom, 2012).
This form of collective bargaining, where teachers, management, and
the union work together every 3 years to define policies, allows the charter
school to balance teachers’ potential concerns with certain conditions
that are associated with academically successful charter schools such as
flexible hiring or longer school days (Fryer, 2014). It also affords charter
school teachers legal representation when employers engage in unfair
labor practices or retaliatory actions (American Federation of Teachers
v. Ledbetter, 2012; California Teachers Association v. Public Employment
Relations Board, 2009).
Union representatives and charter leaders have agreed that charter
schools could have their own bargaining unit to discuss the issues teachers and management feel would help them to do their work better (Hill
et al., 2006). While some efforts exist to improve teacher input and working
conditions in charter schools whether through collective bargaining, unionization, or otherwise (Kahlenberg & Potter, 2014), most charter schools do
not engage in these efforts despite strong evidence of high rates of teacher
dissatisfaction and turnover across the sector. Moreover, little is known about
how laws related to collective bargaining in charter schools may enable or
restrict the kinds of flexible bargaining agreements we see in organizations
like Green Dot.

Charter Categories and Collective Bargaining
While charters allow for the creation of new public schools, there are
important differences in how they are created which affects possibilities
for collective bargaining. Some separate these differences into three categories: startup schools that open with new facilities and new staff, voluntary
conversion schools which are pre-existing public schools that may retain
some staff and become charters with approval from a governing board, and
forced conversion schools that are pre-existing schools with chronic lowperformance whose conversion is mandated by an authorizing agency to
establish a charter contract (Crutchfield, 2015). According to the National
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Charter School Resource Center (2014), conversion charters comprised 11%
of all charter schools and had the heaviest representation in California (21%),
Maryland (23%), Georgia (28%), Arkansas (44%), Louisiana (70%), and Iowa
(100%) as of 2012–2013. Becoming part of a district CBA may have different
implications for different kinds of charters. Since conversion schools often
employ some if not many of the pre-existing teaching staff, these teachers
may have similar expectations compared to their previous arrangement particularly for provisions such as salary and benefits. In these cases, we might
expect teacher satisfaction to be similar when comparing preconversion
to conversion (at least with respect to salary, benefits, etc.) if conversions
become part of a district CBA. Additionally, national data show that conversion charter schools pay staff over $5,100 more on average and rely
much less on uncredentialed and part-time teachers than do start-up schools
(Bodine et al., 2008). This gap is affected by differences in state laws for conversion and nonconversion charters. We explore some of these differences
in detail with examples from various states in the section that follows.

REVIEW OF STATE LAWS
We find that the majority of charter schools have significant flexibility to
opt out of and negotiate CBAs outside of the district CBA, although on the
whole, laws appear slightly more restrictive for conversion charter schools
(see Table 1). While many charter teachers and leaders do not engage in
collective bargaining efforts despite the potential to increase the organizational health of the charter sector, our analysis shows that they often have
the power to do so.
State laws governing collective bargaining in charter schools are quite
nuanced and worth further investigation since they reveal important differences. For instance, even in states that seemingly require charter schools to
be part of the district CBA, there are ways to work with the district and/or
union to negotiate terms outside of the district CBA. To better understand
how the law enables or constrains collective bargaining, we provide examples of this variation and possibilities within the law for conversion and
newly created charter schools.
Our research revealed three broad legal approaches to the issue of collective bargaining in the different types of charter schools. In other words,
the states’ legal approaches to charter school collective bargaining vary based
on whether the charter school is a conversion school or a nonconversion
(startup) school with the exception of a minority of states where there is no
distinction based on charter school type. The three legal approaches are as
follows: (a) public schools converted into charter schools continue to operate under the terms of the school district’s collective bargaining agreement,
(b) nonconversion charter schools (commonly referred to in state laws as
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newly created schools) have the choice of joining the collective bargaining
unit of the district in which they are located or forming their own, and (c) all
charter schools (conversion and newly created charter schools) are treated
alike. In the minority of states using this third approach, certain avenues
(discussed as follows) are provided for any type of charter school to bypass
the district CBA.
Even within these three broad approaches, there are at least six variations in the states’ treatment of collective bargaining in charter schools as
evident in Table 1: (a) conversion charter schools are required to be part
of the district CBA; (b) conversion charter schools (or the charter school
employees) can opt (or opt not) to be part of the district CBA; (c) newly
created (nonconversion) charter schools are allowed to negotiate CBAs separate from the district CBA; (d) all charter schools (both conversion and
newly created) are part of the district CBA unless both the district and the
district union agree to an exemption; (e) all charter schools are eligible to be
governed by terms of the district CBA unless the charter provides otherwise;
and (f) all charter schools are part of the district CBA unless both the charter
school and majority of its employees (or both the charter school and the
public school union) agree otherwise.

Conversion Charter Schools
While a handful of laws stipulate that conversion charter schools are required
to be part of their district’s CBA, most states offer flexible arrangements
(see Table 1—columns A and B). This is important because there may be
particular policies or conditions that new and rehired teachers could create
or address to increase their sense of satisfaction and voice.
Some states are more restrictive when it comes to possibilities for collective bargaining. In Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey,
and New York, conversion charter schools must remain part of the district
CBA (Column A of Table 1). Even then, there are a few notable distinctions
between these states. In Alaska, for example, charter schools are obligated
to join the existing district CBA only for employees of the district who get
employed by the charter school (Alaska Statutes Annotated § 14.03.270 (b),
2014). Once the CBA expires, the charter school can then negotiate, for those
employees, a separate agreement from the district CBA. Hawaii includes
all teachers (TPS and charter school teachers) as part of the same CBA
with no opt outs for charter schools (Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated §
89-10.55 (a), 2012; Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated § 89-6 (a)(5), 2010).
However, charter schools (like their public school counterparts) can negotiate supplemental agreements to the CBA as long as the agreement is not one
that requires ratification by the bargaining unit’s employees (Hawaii Revised
Statutes Annotated § 89-10.55 (c), 2012; Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated §
89-6 (e), 2010; Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated § 302D-1 (2014); Hawaii
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Revised Statutes Annotated § 302D-25, 2012). These rules apply to both conversion and newly created charter schools. Wisconsin allows school districts
to determine if a charter school is to be an instrumentality of the district. If the
charter school is an instrumentality of the district, the district is regarded
as the employer of the charter school’s employees; otherwise the charter
school is the employer (Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 118.40 (7), 2014). This
apparently covers both conversion and newly created schools.
Some states give conversion charter schools or the charter school’s
employees the liberty to decide how they proceed with their collective
bargaining (Column B of Table 1). In other words, the charter school or
its employees can decide to join or not join the district CBA. As with the
prior category, there are a few noteworthy distinctions between the states.
In Alaska, for instance, conversion charter schools only have liberty not to
abide by the district CBA for charter employees that were not district employees at the time of the conversion (Alaska Statutes Annotated § 14.03.270 (b),
2014; Alaska Statutes Annotated § 23.40.070 (2014); Alaska Statutes Annotated
§ 23.40.080, 2014). Massachusetts gives conversion Horace Mann charter
schools liberty not to follow certain district CBA terms if the majority of the
faculty approve a memorandum of understanding between the charter school
and the district’s union waiving those terms (Massachusetts General Laws
Annotated 71 § 89 (c), 2014). Horace Mann charter schools are schools operated based on a charter approved by the district, the district union and the
state board of elementary and secondary education (Massachusetts General
Laws Annotated 71 § 89 (c), 2014; 603 Code of Massachusetts Regulations
1.00, 2015).
Louisiana has several types of charter schools: (a) Type 1 charter
school—a newly created charter school that is based on a charter between a
district and a nonprofit corporation established to run the school; (b) Type
1 B charter school—a conversion charter school or a newly created charter
school based on a charter between a local charter authorizer and a nonprofit
corporation established to run the school; (c) Type 2 charter school—a conversion charter school or a newly created charter school based on a charter
between the state’s board of elementary and secondary education and a nonprofit corporation established to run the school; (d) Type 3 charter school—a
conversion charter school based on a charter between a district and a nonprofit corporation; (e) Type 3 B charter school—a charter school that was
previously a Type 5 school transferred from the recovery school district to the
transferring local school district’s administration; (f) Type 4 charter school—
a conversion charter school or a newly created charter school based on
a charter between the state board of elementary and secondary education
and the school district; and (g) Type 5 charter school—a TPS transferred to
the recovery school district because it is a failing school. A Type 5 charter
school is essentially a conversion charter school based on a charter between
a nonprofit corporation and the state board of elementary and secondary
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education (Louisiana Administrative Code, tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 107 (D),
2013). Type 5 schools are authorized to bargain collectively with all or some
of their employees; and they have flexibility as to how they approach bargaining (Louisiana Administrative Code, tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 2901 (E), 2008).
Thus, Type 5 schools could choose to proceed pursuant to the district CBA.
Beyond a blanket statement granting charter schools exclusive authority over
employment decisions, the law is silent on the collective bargaining status of
the other types of charter schools (other than the Types 2 and 4 schools
discussed later in this article) (Louisiana Administrative Code, tit. 28, pt.
CXXXIX, § 2901 (A), 2008; Louisiana Administrative Code, tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX,
§ 2901 (C), 2008).
Minnesota law provides that charter schools (both newly created and
conversion charter schools) cannot be part of the district’s collective bargaining unit unless the school district board, the district’s union, charter
school board, and the charter school employees all agree to the inclusion
(Minnesota Statutes Annotated § 124D.10 (21), 2014). In Ohio, a majority of
the conversion charter school’s employees can choose to be excluded from
the district CBA if the state employment relations board finds that certain certification requirements are satisfied (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3314.10
(A), 2012). The law also provides that employees of a charter school that
is sponsored by a municipal school district can be wholly removed from
the district CBA and all collective bargaining units if the mayor so requests
(Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3314.102, 2011). In Oregon, although
the law does not specifically discuss conversion schools, the language
of the law suggests that district CBAs can only govern district-sponsored
charter schools (Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated § 338.135 (2)(a),
2003).
Oklahoma law provides that a charter contract may allow collective
bargaining but charter schools are not required to engage in collective
bargaining (70 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 3-135 (B), 1999). Presumably,
this rule applies to newly created charter schools and conversion charter
schools because the law does not distinguish between the schools for
collective bargaining purposes (70 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 3-135
(B), 1999; 70 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 3-136 (A)(5), 1999). The
law also provides that the charter contract shall “specifically set forth the
salary, hours, fringe benefits, and work conditions” (70 Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 3-135 (B), 1999).
These examples illustrate various possibilities for collective bargaining
and even in more restrictive cases conversion charters can retain a degree
of flexibility in their approach to collective bargaining. For instance, even in
states like Alaska or Hawaii which require charter schools to be part of collective bargaining agreements, there are exceptions once the CBA expires
(Alaska) and room to create supplemental agreements (Hawaii). In less
restrictive cases conversion charter employees have the power to decide
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how to proceed with respect to collective bargaining, a process that could
allow conversion charter employees to define conditions and policies that
are most agreeable to them.

Newly Created (Nonconversion) Charter Schools
In several states, newly created charter schools can negotiate CBAs separate
from the district CBA (see column C in Table 1). A few of these states present
nuances to their approach to the general rule that all newly created charter
schools in those states can negotiate outside of the district CBA.
One such nuance is in Arkansas law that broadly grants collective
bargaining rights to employees by declaring it a public policy under
the state constitution (Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-3-301, 2014). Such
constitutional enshrinement of collective bargaining rights is superior to
statutory rights as it is very difficult to change constitutional provisions.
Additionally, the constitution always supersedes statutory law. In Idaho,
where statutory law governs collective bargaining, apparently newly created
charter schools as well as conversion charter schools are governed by the
same statutory provision as there is no distinction in the law between the
collective bargaining status of conversion schools and newly created schools
(Idaho Code Annotated § 33-5205 (3)(q), 2015). This is likewise the case
in Montana, Nevada, and New Hampshire (Montana Administrative Rule
10.55.60410.55.604 (11), 1989; Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated 386.595
(2), 2013). Under these state laws, charter schools can negotiate their own
CBAs separate from the district CBA.
In fact, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania laws specifically
provide that all charter school collective bargaining units must be separate
from the school district’s (New Hampshire Revised Statutes § 194-B:13, 2008;
New Hampshire Revised Statutes § 194-B:14, 2008; New York McKinney’s
Education Law § 2854 (3) (b-1), 2014; 24 Pennsylvania Statutes § 17–1724A (a), 2011). This rule covers both conversion and newly created schools
in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania while in New York it only applies to
newly created charter schools. Moreover, New York law provides that “[t]he
charter school may, in its sole discretion, choose whether or not to offer the
terms of any existing collective bargaining to school employees” (McKinney’s
Education Law § 2854 (3) (b-1)(iv), 2014). Washington State law also requires
that a charter school’s collective bargaining unit must be separate from that of
the school district (Revised Code of Washington Annotated 41.56.0251, 2012).
This collective bargaining unit rule ostensibly covers the CBA agreements;
and applies to both conversion and newly created schools even though
the law does not explicitly distinguish the schools. The state, however,
gives charter schools broad powers to fire employees in accordance with
their charters (Revised Code of Washington Annotated 28A.710.030 (1)(a),
2012).

516

A. C. Torres and J. Oluwole

In Ohio, the nuance is that while the law does not specifically address
CBAs for newly created charter schools, it generally provides that charter schools can bargain collectively separately from the district CBA unless
they are conversion charter schools and as such subject to different statutory requirements (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3314.10 (A)(2), 2012).
In Rhode Island, all independent charter schools (charter schools established
by Rhode Island colleges/universities or by Rhode Island nonprofit organizations) have the right to define the terms and conditions of employment for
their employees in their charters (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77.3-2 (a)(12), 2010; General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77-2.1 (2), 2010). Massachusetts law specifically empowers charter
school employees to collectively bargain:
[a] charter school shall recognize an employee organization designated by
the authorization cards of 50 per cent of its employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit as the exclusive representative of all the employees in
such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. (Massachusetts General
Laws Annotated 71 § 89 (y), 2014)

Even though Missouri statute fails to codify a procedural framework
for teachers to collectively bargain, the state constitution guarantees collective bargaining rights to all public and private sector employees (American
Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 2012; Slater, 2012). Consequently, charter
school employees are entitled to bargain with their employers pursuant to
any framework agreed to by both parties as long as it is in good faith.

All Charter Schools
A few state laws provide uniform pathways for both conversion and newly
created charter schools to create their own CBAs independent of the school
district. For instance, Alaska and Rhode Island laws provide that all charter
schools (conversion and newly created) are part of the district CBA unless
both the district and the district union agree to an exemption (see column
D of Table 1). In Alaska, this rule applies to district teachers who are hired
at charter schools. For such employees, the district CBA follows them to
the charter school until the district CBA expires (Alaska Statutes Annotated
§ 14.03.270 (b), 2014). In Rhode Island, all district charter schools (charter schools created by school districts) are part of the district CBA except
as agreed to by the district and the district union, and specified in the
charter (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated 1956, § 16-77.2-2 (a)(14),
2010; General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated 1956, § 16-77-2.1 (1), 2010).
In Massachusetts, all charter schools except commonwealth charter schools
are bound by the district CBA (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated 71
§ 89 (c), 2014). Commonwealth charter schools are schools that operate
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independently of the district under a charter approved by the board of elementary and secondary education (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
71 § 89 (c), 2014).
In Arkansas, California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, all charter schools
are eligible to be governed by district CBA terms unless the charter provides
otherwise (Column E of Table 1). However, the Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Massachusetts laws have some nuances to the approach. For instance, the
definitions section of Arkansas’ law declares that conversion public charter
schools and limited public charter schools are part of the local public school
system (Arkansas Code Annotated § 6–23-103, 2013). Consequently, they are
presumably part of the district CBA unless, as the statutory definition of
“charter” implies, the charter specifies otherwise (Arkansas Code Annotated
§ 6–23-103, 2013). While open-enrollment public charter schools are not part
of the public school system, teachers in such schools are eligible to be part
of all the benefit programs for district teachers (Arkansas Code Annotated §
6–23-504, 2013).
In Louisiana, the rule that all charter schools are eligible to be governed
by district CBA terms unless the charter provides otherwise only applies to
Type 2 or Type 4 charter schools (Louisiana Administrative Code, tit. 28, pt.
CXXXIX, § 2901 (D), 2008). In Massachusetts, this rule only applies to Horace
Mann charter schools. Specifically, the law provides that a Horace Mann
charter school is “exempt from local collective bargaining agreements to
the extent provided by the terms of its charter” (Massachusetts General Laws
Annotated 71 § 89 (t), 2014). This comes with a caveat: newly created Horace
Mann charter schools must come to accord with the district and the district
union regarding any waivers to the district CBA (Massachusetts General Laws
Annotated 71 § 89 (c)(i)(1), 2014; 603 Code of Massachusetts Regulations
1.02, 2015); 603 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 1.04 (b), 2015).
In Connecticut and Maryland, charter schools can also seek exemption from the district CBA by agreement with certain parties (Column F of
Table 1). In Connecticut, all charter schools are part of the district CBA
unless both the charter school and majority of its employees agree otherwise (Connecticut General Statutes Annotated § 10-66dd (b)(4), 2011).
In Maryland, both the charter school and the public school union must consent in order for the charter school to be exempted from the district CBA
(Maryland Code, Education, § 9-108, 2010).
This section described variation in collective bargaining laws across
states. The next section describes other laws that have the potential to
improve teacher satisfaction and turnover.

Possible Model State Laws: Salary and Benefits
Some studies suggest that working hours and flexibility with hiring and firing
in charter schools can be correlated with success with student learning (see
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Fryer, 2014 or Hoxby & Murarka, 2009, for examples). While many charter
leaders and policymakers view those aspects of the charter environment as
critical to school success, it may be easier to make an argument that investing in better teacher salaries and benefits for charter school teachers would
increase student success and school stability by reducing turnover. Therefore,
in addition to looking at current variations across states with respect to collective bargaining laws, it is also worth exploring how state laws can directly
address this turnover gap to the extent that it is attributable to salary and
benefits.
Indeed, in some states, the salary gap can be quite large. As one example, the gap between charter and traditional teachers in Michigan ranged
from 10% to 40% and widens with increasing teacher experience, and the
pay gap grew as large as $20,000 for the same level of experience (Harris
& Plank, 2003). However, various states have laws that could serve as a
model to reduce these disparities. Most commonly, these laws require charter employees to receive comparable salary and benefits as traditional school
employees. We describe some of these possibilities below and the example
laws we reviewed can be found in Table 2.
In Arkansas, a limited public charter school is a conversion charter
school created to provide “alternative comprehensive staffing and compensation programs designed to enhance student and teacher performance and
improve employee salaries, opportunities, and incentives” (Arkansas Code
Annotated § 6-23-601 (a)(1), 2013). Arkansas law guarantees a comparable salary for teachers in these limited public charter schools. Such charter
schools cannot pay their teachers less than the salary that the teacher would
qualify for in the district salary schedule (Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-23601 (b)(1)(C), 2013). An open-enrollment charter school in Arkansas is a
public charter school that is open to students from any district in the state
(Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-23-103 (9)(A), 2013). While teachers employed
by open-enrollment public charter schools do not qualify for such comparable salaries, they are statutorily entitled to participate in all benefits programs
for district employees (Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-23-504, 2007).
In South Carolina, conversion charter school teachers have the legal
right to the same salaries as district teachers (Code of Laws of South Carolina
1976 Annotated § 59-40-100 (D), 2013). Florida requires charter schools
to implement a performance-based salary schedule as used in the TPSs
(Florida Statutes Annotated §1012.22, 2014). Missouri allows district teachers
hired by a charter school to remain district employees for salary purposes.
The charter school must pay the district the teacher’s full district salary
(Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes 160.420 (1), 2012). Massachusetts
requires Horace Mann charter schools to pay their teachers, at minimum, the
salary provided in the district CBA; even if the charter school is otherwise
exempt from the district CBA (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated 71 § 89
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School district teachers who are hired by a charter school
in the district have the choice of remaining employees of
the district for purposes of their salary. In such a case,
the charter school pays the district the teacher’s full
district salary (Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes
160.420 (1), 2012).

Charter school cannot pay teachers a salary less than the
minimum statutory base salary for teachers employed in
the school district where the charter school is. The
charter school also cannot pay a higher salary than the
topmost step in the district’s CBA salary guide (New
Jersey Statutes Annotated 18A:36A-14, 2014; New Jersey
Statutes Annotated 18A:29-5.6, 2008).

New Jersey

Limited public charter school cannot pay a full-time
licensed employee less than the salary in the school
district’s salary schedule applicable to that charter school
employee (Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-23-601
(b)(1)(C), 2013).
Charter schools must implement a performance-based
salary schedule like public schools (Florida Statutes
Annotated §1012.22, 2014).
Even when a Horace Mann charter school is exempt from
the district CBA, its teachers must be paid at least the
salary provided in the district CBA (Massachusetts
General Laws Annotated 71 § 89 (t), 2014; 603 Code of
Massachusetts Regulations 1.04 (b)-(c), 2015).

Salary

Missouri

Massachusetts

Florida

Arkansas

State

TABLE 2 Examples of Salary and Benefits Provisions in State Charter Laws

(Continued)

Even when a Horace Mann charter school is exempt from
the district CBA, the school must provide benefits that
are, at minimum, equivalent to those provided in the
district CBA (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated 71 §
89 (t), 2014; 603 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 1.04
(b)-(c), 2015).
In addition to remaining district employees for salary
purposes, teachers hired by a charter school in the
district who opt to remain district employees also retain
the district benefits. The charter school must pay the
district the teacher’s full district benefits (Vernon’s
Annotated Missouri Statutes 160.420 (1), 2012).
Additionally, such teachers retain their seniority rights in
the district for 3 years (Vernon’s Annotated Missouri
Statutes 160.420 (1), 2012).

Open-enrollment public charter school must be allowed to
be part of all benefits programs for public school
employees (Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-23-504, 2007).

Benefits
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Tennessee

South Carolina

Rhode Island

Pennsylvania

Oklahoma

State

Salary

Teachers at independent charter schools as well as those at
mayoral academies must be paid the prevailing wages
and benefits received by public school teachers in the
state (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated 1956, §
16-77.3-2 (a)(12), 2010; General Laws of Rhode Island
Annotated 1956, § 16-77.4-2 (a)(13)(i), 2010).
Conversion charter school employees are entitled to the
same salaries (and future salary increases) as those for
teachers in the school district (Code of Laws of South
Carolina 1976 Annotated § 59-40-100 (D), 2013).
However, the conversion charter school must quarterly
reimburse the school district for the salary paid to the
teachers (Code of Laws of South Carolina
1976 Annotated § 59-40-100 (D), 2013).

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Conversion charter school employees are entitled to the
same benefits (and future benefit increases) that district
teachers get (Code of Laws of South Carolina
1976 Annotated § 59-40-100 (D), 2013). Every quarter,
the conversion charter school must reimburse the district
for the employer contributions toward the benefits
(Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976 Annotated §
59-40-100 (D), 2013).
Charter school teachers are entitled to the same group
insurance plans as teachers in the school district
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-13-119, 2011;
Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-27-301 et seq., 2010).

Charter school employees may participate in the health
insurance and related insurance programs of the
sponsoring school district (70 Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 3-136 (A)(15), 1999).
Charter schools must provide their employees the same
health care benefits as the employee would have
received as a school district employee. The law also
provides that the local school board can obligate the
charter school to give its employees the same terms and
conditions in the district CBA for health insurance
(24 Pennsylvania Statutes § 17-1724-A (d), 2011).

Benefits
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(t), 2014; 603 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 1.04 (b)-(c), 2015). In New
Jersey, charter school are prohibited from paying teachers a salary less than
the minimum statutory base salary for the district teachers (New Jersey
Statutes Annotated 18A:29-5.6, 2008; New Jersey Statutes Annotated 18A:36A14, 2014). The charter school is also barred from paying its teachers a salary
higher than the topmost step in the district’s CBA salary guide. In Rhode
Island, independent charter school teachers as well as mayoral academy
teachers must be paid the prevailing wages and benefits received by public school teachers in the state (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77.3-2 (a)(12), 2010; General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77.4-2 (a)(13)(i), 2010). Independent charter schools are charter schools established by Rhode Island colleges/universities or by Rhode
Island nonprofit organizations (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77-2.1 (2), 2010). Mayoral academies are mayor-created charter
schools developed on behalf of or through nonprofit organizations. Mayoral
academies also enroll students from multiple towns that include both urban
and nonurban communities and they offer equal student enrollment based
on lottery (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated 1956, § 16-77.4-1 (a),
2010).
With respect to benefits, Missouri law provides that district teachers
hired by a charter school can choose to remain district employees, retaining their district benefits. The charter school, however, must pay the district
for the teacher’s full district benefits (Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes
160.420 (1), 2012). In Massachusetts, Horace Mann charter schools must provide their teachers benefits that are at least equivalent to those provided
in the district CBA even if the school is otherwise exempt from the district
CBA (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated 71 § 89 (t), 2014; 603 Code
of Massachusetts Regulations 1.04 (b)-(c), 2015). Oklahoma gives charter
school employees the right to participate in the health insurance and related
insurance programs of the sponsoring school district (70 Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 3-136 (A)(15), 1999).
Pennsylvania law requires charter schools to provide their teachers the
same health care benefits the teacher would be entitled to as a district
employee (24 Pennsylvania Statutes § 17-1724-A (d), 2011). The local school
board can also require the charter school to give its employees the same
health insurance terms and conditions in the district CBA. Rhode Island
requires charter schools to provide their teachers the prevailing benefits
received by public school teachers (General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77.3-2 (a)(12), 2010; General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated
1956, § 16-77.4-2 (a)(13)(i), 2010). South Carolina obligates conversion charter schools to give their teachers the same benefits that district teachers enjoy
(Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976 Annotated § 59-40-100 (D), 2013).
In Tennessee, charter schools must provide their teachers the same group
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insurance plans as district teachers (Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-27-301 et
seq., 2010; Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-13-119, 2011).
As seen in these examples, various states have taken active measures to
provide some basic protections around salary and benefits for charter school
teachers; an approach that would be helpful for states where the connection
to teacher turnover is strong.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our goal in providing this analysis was to describe the many possibilities
and variations for collective bargaining by state and for different charter
types, then to describe some laws that have the potential to improve teacher
satisfaction in charter schools. Ideally, state laws and the collective bargaining process should provide the appropriate balance between flexibility for
charter school leaders, teacher voice, and protections for teachers.
Often, collective bargaining laws are overly cumbersome or prescriptive
which explains some of the resistance within the charter sector. For instance,
Strunk (2014) analyzed a sample of 506 California CBAs from 2008–2009 and
found that 63% of these provisions specified the amount of time teachers
must work each day, 93% required teachers to receive extra compensation
for an increased workload, and most specified conditions for assignment
and transfer of staff. As examples, policies like these would reduce flexibility and autonomy over the school day, staff composition, and budget
and create conflict since charter leaders consider financial, managerial, and
instructional flexibility crucial to school success (Hill et al., 2006). However,
there are states like Michigan where new laws could improve the large gap
between TPSs and charter schools in terms of teacher pay. Even if charter
schools in states where there are large pay discrepancies between charter
and traditional public teachers provide slightly better academic results than
comparable traditional schools, chronic teacher turnover is still a concern
because it can undermine teacher professionalism, efforts to increase student
achievement sustainably, and the scalability of charter models (Kahlenberg
& Potter, 2015; Torres, 2014a; Yeh, 2013).
Evidence on teacher salaries in charter schools tends to come from studies at the turn of the century (Bodine et al., 2008; Malloy & Wohlstetter,
2003). More recent evidence is needed to determine whether charter teachers with comparable characteristics and experience receive lower salaries
or inferior benefits than their traditional counterparts in light of the rapid
growth of charter schools. Although some national evidence suggests that
charters spend less on teacher salaries than TPSs (Miron & Urschel, 2010),
this could be due in part to potential funding disparities between TPSs
and charter schools (Batdorff et al., 2014; Bodine et al., 2008). However,
the strength of that conclusion and the methods used to calculate apparent
funding inequities are contested (Baker, 2014).
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We found substantial variation in the procedures and processes states
currently use to address collective bargaining. We focused primarily on
describing this variation because more research is needed to determine the
extent to which becoming part of a district CBA (or not) affects teacher
satisfaction in forced conversion, voluntary conversion, and newly created
charter schools. While most states do not require newly created charters
to be part of district CBAs, several states require conversion charters to do
so. It may be the case that teachers in conversion schools are more satisfied, on average, with being part of the district CBA because they have
retained some of the previous school’s staff who were subject to the same
conditions. However, despite finding some clear differences in the laws that
dictate collective bargaining for conversion versus newly created schools, we
lack empirical evidence to know whether and why this is true. Additionally,
while there have been studies using national data that link teacher turnover
with salary, benefits, job security, and other factors, state and local studies
need to be conducted in order to establish this link to provide more context
and to examine where and why these connections are strongest.
While we offered some possibilities to improve teacher pay or benefits, much more research is needed to provide stronger recommendations for
policy and practice. Research is lacking around the differences between conversion (including forced vs. voluntary) and newly created charters, as well
as teachers’ perceptions of collective bargaining and the conditions affected
by collective bargaining within these different charter school contexts. More
research could investigate why most charter teachers and leaders neglect to
engage in some form of collective bargaining. While this issue is typically
framed as reluctance and worry over creating bureaucracy (Vevea, 2011),
there may also be issues of knowledge and capacity over how and why
to engage in collective bargaining. Finally, both quantitative and qualitative
studies are needed to provide context in determining how and why teacher
mobility is related to the factors we have identified. Studies could help us
better understand, for example, the situations where teachers desire better
job security (and the types of teachers/schools where this is likely to occur),
or whether and why they leave for better salaries within or outside the field
of education.
Finally, we found that the vast majority of states with charter school
laws can negotiate CBAs separately from district CBAs. While the procedures
may vary, charters in most states could (legally speaking) follow the path of
Green Dot that we described to regularly allow teachers to have more voice
in policies and procedures related to their satisfaction, thereby, potentially
increasing the longevity of their teaching staff. At a minimum, more charter
schools and policymakers should be aware of the possibilities and examples
within and outside of their states, as well as the larger need to address
teacher voice, satisfaction, and turnover in charters (Kahlenberg & Potter,
2015; Torres, 2014b).

524

A. C. Torres and J. Oluwole

ORCID
A. Chris Torres

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2257-8597

NOTES
1. These are typically negotiated in the collective bargaining process (salary, benefits, working
hours, tenure, etc.).
2. Conversion schools can similarly negotiate CBAs separate from that of the district (Michigan
Compiled Laws Annotated 423.215, 2013).
3. While the law does not specifically address the CBA status of conversion charter schools, it
provides that the school district can be the employer, for purposes of collective bargaining, for school
district-sponsored charter schools (Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated § 338.135 (2)(a), (8), 2003).
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